Research

Research

My research agenda explores three broad topics:

The sociological dynamics of international order and alliances;
How states combine elements of their foreign policy "toolkit" to signal commitment and bolster security;
Foreign and security policy in East Asia.

A comprehensive statement on my research interests can be found here.

Peer-Reviewed Articles

Kuo, Raymond and Spindel, Jennifer. (2023). "The Unintended Consequences of Arms Embargoes." Foreign Policy Analysis. 19:1.

To what extent do arms embargoes curtail the embargoed state’s ability to get conventional weapons? We argue that arms embargoes rarely prevent states from receiving conventional weapons, and are one of the few events that push states to switch their supplier base. Using a new dataset on the place of origin of conventional weapons, we provide a more full and complete picture of the effects of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations and European Union. We show that middlemen, a previously obscured category of states who sell, but do not produce arms, are crucial to skirting embargoes. This article suggests that arms embargoes are a more complicated foreign policy tool than scholars have previously appreciated, and that policymakers need to be cautious in imposing them.

Kuo, Raymond and Blankenship, Brian. (2022). “Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 66:1. Lead Article. Online Appendix | Replication Files: Target Models and Participant Models

Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But it has often been argued that joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of war. Using a relational contracting approach, we claim this view applies only to JMEs conducted outside an alliance. Exercises and alliances serve complementary functions: The former allows targeted responses to military provocations by adversaries, while the latter provides institutional constraints on partners and establishes a partnership's overall strategic limitations. In combination, alliances dampen the conflict escalation effects of exercises, deterring adversaries while simultaneously restraining partners. We test this theory using a two-stage model on directed dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003.
Write-up by Brian Blankenship applying this paper's insight to Ukraine-NATO military exercises in Political Violence @ a Glance.

Kuo, Raymond. (2020). "Secrecy Among Friends: Covert Military Alliances and Portfolio Consistency." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Draft | Online Appendix.

Scholars think that friendly nations adopt secrecy to avoid domestic costs and facilitate cooperation. But this paper uncovers a historical puzzle. Between 1870-1916, over 80 percent of alliance ties were partially or completely covert. Otherwise, hidden pacts are rare. Why was secrecy prevalent in this particular period and not others? This paper presents a theory of ``portfolio consistency.'' Public agreements undermine the rank of hidden alliances. A partner willing to openly commit to another country but not to you signals the increased importance of this other relationship. States pressure their covert partners to avoid subsequent public pacts. This creates a network effect: the more secret partners a state has, the greater the incentives to maintain secrecy in later military agreements. Covert alliances have a cumulative effect. In seeking the flexibility of hidden partnerships, states can lock themselves into a rigid adherence to secrecy.

Kuo, Raymond. (2019). "Communal Violence and Economic Migration in Pakistan." International Migration. Draft | Online Supplement.

Overseas employment provides multiple socioeconomic benefits for families and communities in sending countries. But communal violence can potentially disrupt these flows, causing lasting damage to local and national economic development. Under what conditions does political violence – and particularly low-intensity sectarian conflict – increase or decrease economic migration? This paper argues that the level of militant control over local political and social institutions conditions whether individuals emigrate for work. Using statistical analysis of Pakistani data on overseas employment and political violence, it finds that attacks by transnational/Islamist militants on local political institutions substantially reduce economic migration. Attacks against non-political targets have no significant effect, further emphasizing the importance of local institutions.

Kuo, Raymond. (2015). "Correspondence: Evolution and Territorial Conflict." International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3.

Johnson and Toft (2014)'s biological explanations for human territoriality is problematic for four reasons. First, it engages in the "adaptationist fallacy" in lieu of clearly specifying a causal, biological mechanism. Second, they fail to account for plausible, non-biological alternatives. Third, they invite endogeneity problems by crossing the species barrier and levels of analysis. Fourth, they neglect cutting edge research pointing to the limits of biological inheritance and evolutionary effects on behavior.

Kuo, Raymond. (2008). "Occupation and the Just War." International Relations. Vol. 22, No. 3: 299-321.

Just war theorists have had difficulty assessing the moral character of occupations, since they often fail to engage with the broader mechanisms and ethical issues of control and power inherent to that state of conflict. These challenges, however, cut to the heart of many of the just war tradition’s assumptions, requiring new conceptualizations of its principles and rules for appropriate conduct. This article takes a first step in that direction, recasting the tradition to encompass a wider view of threat and violence in military occupations, using the Israel-Palestine conflict as an illustrative case.

Steele, Liza and Raymond Kuo. (2007). "Terrorism in Xinjiang?" Ethnopolitics, Vol. 6, No. 1: 1-19.

China rarely evokes images of radical Islam, bus bombings and mosque razings. Yet all of these elements have had a distinct impact on life in China’s north-western province, Xinjiang. While the Chinese government has emphasized Islamic extremism and acts of terror to convince international actors that it is confronted with an international terrorist movement, human rights organizations have pointed out the high level of dissatisfaction pervasive among Xinjiang’s Uighur population. The desperation among Uighurs in Xinjiang has spawned a significant terrorist movement. Were the numerous grievances of the Uighurs addressed by Beijing, the movement would lose its limited popular support, which is currently on the rise.

Working Papers

Kuo, Raymond. "Trouble in Paradise: Arms Sales vs. Alliances." | Appendix

Recent studies on arms and allies assume they are additive signals of interstate security support. In fact, they are substitutes: states provide arms to reduce their alliance commitments. This has three implications. First, receiving arms and allies does not deter adversaries. Second, states transferring arms are less likely to support their partners in conflict. Third, this improves alliance cohesion. States gain clarity about the limits of their allies' commitment. I test these implications using statistical analysis of arms sales and alliance commitments from 1945-2014, as well as a case study of U.S.-Korea security relations during the Nixon administration.

Kuo, Raymond. “Measurement Choice and Alliance Reliability.”

How reliable are alliances? Leeds (2000) claim that 74.5 percent of partners uphold their obligations. However, Berkemeier and Fuhrmann (2018) find that, since 1945, only 22.22 percent of allies have fulfilled their promises. This difference is an artifact of measurement biasing descriptive inference. Over the past 300 years, alliances have gotten larger and lasted longer, and failing to account for this creates erroneous estimates of alliance abrogation. This research note examines how alliance reliability studies are sensitive to alternative specifications for the unit of analysis and time. In particular, it finds that major wars cause widespread shifts in alliance features and military obligations, and this ``periodization’’ is a critical omitted variable in studies of alliances.

Kuo, Raymond and Spindel, Jennifer. "The National Origins of Weapons Systems."

Using an original dataset, we discover that arms sales have a "lock-in effect:" By buying one weapon system, you are much more likely to purchase from that country in the future. However, this only happens for weapon producers/originators, not suppliers. Using statistical analysis of arms sales from 1945-2014, as well as a case study on the Indian arms industry, we find that originators create lock-in effects through at least three mechanisms: a desire for interoperability, bolstering alliances, and perceptions of battlefield effectiveness. However, we do not find evidence that countries make repeat purchases of the same systems in order to "top-up" depleted supply.

Kuo, Raymond. “Strategic Uncertainty and Multilateral-Lite Security Partnerships: Assessing the Frequency of ‘Realist’ Alliances”

Realism expects alliances to be large but thinly institutionalized: fluidly aggregating power against threats, then rebalancing against new challengers. However, these “multilateral-lite” alliances were only prevalent from 1870–1920. I argue that norms of appropriate alliance behavior constrained institutionalization: states did not find robust coordination to be a credible signal of commitment. In response, they ally widely, distributing risk and forming loose coalitions with multiple members.

Kuo, Raymond. “Friendship Bracelets? Third-Party Signaling and Minor Alliances.”

A significant portion of alliances are formed by two minor states with limited power projection capabilities. Countries form these "minor alliances" to demonstrate their trustworthiness to third-parties, specifically larger security blocs, By allying with peripheral bloc members, minor pacts act as stepping stones to accession in broader security communities.