**RPOS 371:** **Statecraft and Negotiation**

Fall 2014

Prof. Raymond Kuo

Time & Location: Contact Info:

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This course explores strategic interaction and interstate bargaining from both theoretical and practical perspectives. It is first and foremost a political science course: We will cover theoretical and policy studies on such topics as nuclear disarmament, trade, and human rights.

But theory and policy are fundamentally driven by real world situations and dynamics. That leads to the second purpose of this course: To elucidate theory through simulation. Each class will begin with a brief discussion of the readings. We will then conduct an hour to hour and a half simulation drawn from historical events, current policy challenges, and my own political experience. This provides you with an opportunity to test out theories and approaches, understanding how strategic interaction generates the concepts and causal chains scholars discuss.

Finally, the third purpose of this course is to identify your negotiating style and allow you to understand and shape it. In addition to the theoretical work, each week I have assigned selections from two seminal negotiation books. The simulations are excellent opportunities to practice these lessons while also learning about statecraft.

**Attendance**

Much of our time in class will be spent doing actual negotiations (12 of them), so attending every class is mandatory. If you cannot make this commitment, please do not take the class. Because the roles in the cases are carefully assigned, missing a class hurts everyone’s learning, not just yours. Each class (or part thereof) missed except for verified illness, religious holiday, death in the family, or other serious situations (approved, if possible, in advance) will result in a course grade reduction of one level (i.e., from B- to C+). Missing two unexcused classes will result in a failing grade. In addition, if you intend to drop the course for any reason, I ask that you do so before the third class meeting or risk having your transcript show that you “Withdrew.” In other words, for this class to work, you must make it one of your top priorities this semester in terms of class attendance. Please take this into account in making a final decision to enroll in this section of the course. Finally, the class may not be taken Pass/Fail.

**Readings**

* G. Richard Shell, Bargaining for Advantage (Penguin 2nd edition 2006)
* Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes (Penguin 2nd edition 1991)
* Max Boot. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present.  (W. W. Norton, New York).  2013.
* Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 3-52.
* John Ikenberry, *After Victory*. (Princeton University Press, 2000).
* Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

**Grading**

A principal aim of this course is to allow you the space to discover what type of negotiator you are. In that endeavor, there are no wrong answers. However, a second objective is to use negotiations, strategic interaction, and bargaining to understand foreign policy and interstate dynamics. In addition, negotiators are typically only as good as their reputations. While “hard bargaining” can be helpful in one-off situations, it can leave a lasting impression on others which hurts in the long-run.

This course’s evaluation opportunities are designed to assess your progress on both of these objectives. They are:

1. 2 Short Papers (20%)
* Evaluation of Personal Negotiating Style and Lessons Learned (10%)
* Negotiation Strategy on Present Policy Problem (10%)
1. Original Simulation Design (30%)
2. Peer Evaluation (15%)
3. Midterm (15%) covering theoretical material up to 10/15.
4. Final Exam (20%) covering theoretical material from 10/22 onwards.

To expand on points 2 and 3:

*Creating a Simulation*

Recent research has found that the process of creating a simulation carries even greater educational benefits than participating in one. Each student will choose a concept or theory in international relations and/or comparative politics and develop an original simulation with the goal of illuminating that concept. You also have the option to work in pairs, although once you form a team, you will be evaluated together, no exceptions.

*Peer Feedback on Overall Contribution and Earned Respect*

15 percent of your grade comes from peer evaluations. Each student will rate each other student on a 1 (bottom) – 10 (top) scale based on that peer’s overall, demonstrated contribution to the class’s learning and development. In addition, each student will identify five fellow students as people who gained exceptional respect during the semester as negotiation partners or teammates and exhibited skill at and reputations for simultaneously managing both relationships and transactional success. Scores for this ranking will go from 10 (top) – 6 (bottom). The resulting rankings will then be combined and averaged. The class will be divided into top-, middle-, and bottom-ranked groups. The top group will receive 15 points. The middle group will receive between 10–15 points and the lower group between 1–9 points, based on the instructor’s evaluations of student performance and rankings. I will notify the class of the five people who achieve the highest total scores for gaining respect for their negotiation skills at the end of the semester.

**Schedule**

NOTE: Prior to the first session, please:

1. Review the personality types:
	1. <http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/databases/ppt/Myers-BriggsPersonalityTypesforNegotiation.ppt>
2. Take one of the following personality tests and bring your result to class:
	1. <http://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/JTypes2.asp>
	2. <http://www.16personalities.com/free-personality-test>

*Week 1 (8/27):*

* Introduction: Personal Styles of Negotiation
* Fisher, Ch. 2-6.
* *Simulation*: Expanded, Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

*Week 2 (9/3): Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament*

* Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). chs. 1-3.
* Colin Gray, "Strategic Stability Reconsidered," Daedalus, Fall 1980, pp. 135-154.
* *Simulation*: Two-party negotiation over conventional arms, nuclear arms, and nuclear disarmament.

*Week 3 (9/10): Causes of War*

* Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security, 9:4 Spring 1985.
* John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chs. 1-2.
* Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979). Ch. 6.
* *Simulation*: Five party negotiation on alliances and war initiation.

*Week 4 (9/17): Major War Settlements*

* John Ikenberry, After Victory, Ch. 1, 2, 5.
* Be familiar with the causes of WW1: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_World_War_I>
* *Debate*: “The U.S. should have established a new international order after WW1.”

*Week 5 (10/1): Asymmetric Warfare*

* Max Boot. *Invisible Armies*. pp. 535-550, 557-568.
* Lionel Beehner, “Is Defeating Guerillas Really about Good PR?” <http://ciceromagazine.com/reviews/is-defeating-guerrillas-really-all-about-good-pr/>
* FM 3-24, “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.” Chs. 8-11. <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>
* *Simulation*: Six-party negotiation over public support for guerilla movement.

*Week 6 (10/8): Trade*

* Krugman, Paul R., Marc J. Melitz and Maurice Obstfeld (2009): *International Economics: Theory and Policy*, 9th Edition, Pearson Addison-Wesley. Chpts. 3, 10.
* Baldwin, David. *Economic Statecraft*. (Princeton University Press, 1985). Ch. 10, up to but not including p. 311.
* *Debate*: “Free trade benefits most, if not, all people.”

*Week 7 (10/15): Midterm*

*Week 8 (10/22): Aid*

* Sachs, Jeffrey, “Can Extreme Poverty Be Eliminated?” Scientific American, September 2005, pp. 56-65. <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/Scientific_AmericanSept2005.pdf>
* Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” *Policy Brief* 24 (Carnegie Endowment, 2003), pp. 1-7. (7 pp.) <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief24.pdf>
* Easterly, William Russell. 2006. The white man's burden : why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, Ch. 1.
* Kosack. (2003). “Effective Aid: How Democracy Allows Development Aid to Improve the Quality of Life,” World Development, Vol. 31, No. 1, (p. 1-22). (skim through technical parts)
* *Simulation:* Four party negotiation on military assistance, trade, aid, and government policy.

*Week 9 (10/29): Human Rights*

* Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 3-52.
* Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Commitment in Postwar Europe,” *International Organization*, vol. 54, no. 2 (spring 2000), pp. 217-52.
* Oona Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 111, no. 8 (June 2002), pp. 1935-42, 1962-68, 1976-2002. Skim the rest, pp. 1935-2025. Pay particular attention to pp. 1999-2002.
* Joshua Keating. “Why Countries Make Human Rights Pledges They Have No Intention of Honoring.” Slate.com, Oct. 21, 2014. <http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/10/21/why_countries_make_human_rights_pledges_they_have_no_intention_of_honoring.html>
* *Simulation*: Four party negotiation over human rights charter, with student structural feedback.

*Week 10 (11/5): Democratic Design*

* Taagepera, Rein. 2002. “Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve.” In The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, edited by A. Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248‐266
* Epstein et al. (2007.) “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?” *CRS Report for Congress*. p. 7-17. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf>
* Marc Lynch. “Democracy Promotion.” *Foreign Policy*. Oct. 7, 2013. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/07/promotion_demotion_democracy_middle_east>
* Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf>
* [OPTIONAL] Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, chapter 1, pp. 6-36.
* *Simulation*: Six party negotiation on electoral and constitutional design.

*Week 11 (11/12): Current Policy Challenges: The Iranian Nuclear Program*

* Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Point of No Return,” The Atlantic (September 2010). <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186>**.**
* James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 2 (March/April 2010), pp. 33-49.
* Graham Allison, “Nuclear Disorder,” Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 1 (January/February 2010), pp. 75-85. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65732/graham-allison/nuclear-disorder>
* Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.” *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2012. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the-bomb>
* Colin Kahl and Kenneth Waltz. “Iran and the Bomb.” *Foreign Affairs*. Sept/Oct 2012. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137781/colin-h-kahl-and-kenneth-n-waltz/iran-and-the-bomb>
* *Simulation*: SWOT analysis and four party negotiation over Iranian nuclear program.
* *Debate*: “Iran should get the bomb.”

*Week 12 (11/19): Possible Policy Challenges*

* Strobe Talbott. “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia.” Foreign Affairs. March/April 1999. <http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-422-2012-S1_NP/Syllabus/EReadings/10.1/10.1.zFurther_Talbott1999Dealing.pdf>
* Jaswant Singh. “Against Nuclear Apartheid.” Foreign Affairs. Sept/Oct 1998. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54391/jaswant-singh/against-nuclear-apartheid>
* Simulation: Pakistan Loose Nukes Simulation.

*Week 13 (12/3): Original Simulation Discussion*