**University at Albany**

**RPOS582: Global Security**

**Syllabus, Spring 2015**

**Prof. Raymond Kuo**

*Class Time* *Office Hours*

W 5:45-8:35 PM W 1:30-3:30 PM

Husted Hall 201 210 Milne Hall

 rkuo@albany.edu

**Course Description and Goals**

This graduate seminar surveys the extensive literature on international security. We will explore theories on war initiation, alliances, international institutions and order, and nuclear weapons. We will also examine how variables like trade, democracy, and psychology affect these conditions and dynamics. In addition, students will evaluate these theories based on their logic and empirical validity, as well as apply them to major policy challenges from history and to those facing the world currently.

The course presupposes that students are familiar with international relations concepts and theories. In addition, much of the cutting edge work in political science uses quantitative methods in part or in whole. Familiarity with these methods, even at an introductory level, is extremely helpful for this course.

This course is aimed at two types of students. The first are Ph.D. and MA students in Political Science who have completed POS 570: Field Seminar in International Relations (or are taking the course concurrently). The readings and discussion will provide you with a solid basis in international security in preparation for the comprehensive exam, which you should take within two and a half years of starting your graduate career. For these students, the course has the following goals:

1. To further students’ familiarity with the large academic literature on international security to help them prepare for the synthesis and analysis they will be required to carry out on the IR field exam.
2. To introduce students to a variety of frontier research problems that animate current work in the field, so they can see and evaluate examples of how research is actually conducted rather than just commenting on “the classics” or reading pure theory.
3. To initiate one or more of their own empirical research projects, to gain practical experience in elaborating a theoretical argument, drawing out testable implications, assembling and analyzing relevant evidence, and presenting the work in stages before colleagues.

The second group is terminal MPA students, with the following course goals:

1. To provide a solid understanding of scholarly inquiry and how to “bridge the gap” between political science to make effective policy.
2. For you to assess policy challenges through multiple theoretical lenses (creating an analytical “toolkit”). To apply this toolkit to assess current policy challenges.

**Course Requirements**

The formal requirements for the course include:

1. *Attendance and active participation in discussion*: Students will be required to attend class, to do all the required readings for each week, and to take an active role in discussing the readings. I will evaluate participation as preparedness and input to discussion.
2. *Issue Papers*: Each week two students (or more depending on the size of the class) will prepare brief papers (at least 3 pages, but ideally more) offering a guide to the key issues in that week’s readings. These students will lead discussion for the first half of each class. Issue papers will be distributed 36 hours prior to class. Students must be prepared to defend this paper in class.

One final requirement will depend on whether you are a Ph.D./MA student or an MPA student. For the former:

1. *Two 5-7 pp. research proposals*, each consisting of:
2. A description of the “puzzle” that you are trying to solve.
3. A clear and succinct statement of a theoretical argument on an important question that you extract from the literature or develop yourself.
4. A characterization of the population of cases to which the theoretical argument/hypotheses apply, and the description of a sample (or way of sampling) from this population.
5. A preliminary assessment or “plausibility probe” based on brief examination of one or more cases from a sample, or a “quick” coding of variables for a simple descriptive analysis.

For MPA students:

1. *Two 5-7 pp. policy memos* of a current policy challenge. Topics should be selected in consultation with the instructor.

For both the research proposals and policy memos, the first is due sometime within the first half of the semester (by March 4). The second is due before the end of the semester (by May 8).

**Books**

* + Andrew Bennett and Alexander George. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005).
	+ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
	+ John Lewis Gaddis. *The Landscape of History.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
	+ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
* John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
* Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979).
* John Ikenberry. *After Victory*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
* Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992).
* David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*
* Stephen Biddle. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
* Barbara Farnham (ed.) *Avoiding Losses, Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

**Readings and Schedule**

Week 1 (January 21, 2015): ***Methods in Security***

1. Making causal inferences
	* Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Chps. 1-4, 6.
	* John Lewis Gaddis. The Landscape of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chps. 4-5.
	* Andrew Bennett and Alexander George,.Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), Chps. 1, 7, 12, and appendix.
	* James Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43 (January 1991): 169-195.
2. Rational choice?
	* Steven M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security 23 (1999): 5-48.
	* Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions,” International Security 24 (1999): 56-73.
	* [OPTIONAL] John Conlisk, “Why Bounded Rationality,” Journal of Economic Literature 34 (June 1996): 669-700.
3. Levels of Analysis
* Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), ch. 1.
1. What Is National Security Policy?
* Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics, ch. 10.

Week 2 (January 28, 2015): ***Realism***

*Issue Paper: Isabella*

* John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chs. 1-2, 10.
* Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979). Read the entire book if you have not already. Review chs. 6-8 carefully for this seminar.
* Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security, 9:4 Spring 1985.

*Recent Debates on the Relevance of Realism for Contemporary Strategy*

* R. Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Great Power Peace,” American Political Science Re view, Volume 96, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 1-14
* John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” *Foreign Policy*, Nov/Dec 2002, pp. 50-57. May be available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>
* Jack Snyder, “Imperial Temptations,” *The National Interest*, Spring 2003.
* Philip Zelikow, “The Transformation of National Security,” *National Interest,* Spring 2003.

Week 3 (February 4, 2015): ***Why Do Wars Happen?***

*Issue Paper: Yihao*

1. Game Theoretic Accounts
* James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49:3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
* Robert Powell, “Bargaining in the Shadow of Power,” In The Shadow of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Chp 3.
* Andrew Kydd, “Game theory and the spiral model,” World Politics 49:3 (April 1997): 371-400.
1. World War 1
* Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984).
* Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and what It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32:2 (Fall 2007) 155-191.
* Jack Snyder and Keir A. Lieber , “Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the ‘New’ History of World War I,” International Security 33:1 (Summer 2008): 174-194.
* Mark Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 120-150.

Week 4 (February 11, 2015): ***Hegemonic Theories***

*Issue Paper: Cecilia*

1. Power Transition Theory
* Jack S. Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.” In Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008. Pp. 11-33.
* A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1968. Chap. 14.
* [OPTIONAL] Ronald L. Tammen, et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000. Chap. 1
1. Gilpin's Hegemonic Transition Theory
	* Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, 4 (Spring 1988): 591-614.
2. Preventive War
	* Jack S. Levy, “Preventive War and Democratic Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 52, 1 (March 2008): 1-24.
	* Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization, 60, 1 (Winter 2006), 169-204.
3. Long Cycle Theory
	* Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change." In Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. 301-31.
	* Eric Gartzke, “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization, 53, 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 567-587.

Week 5 (February 18, 2015): ***Do wars spillover? How do they end?***

*Issue Paper: Luuk*.Please note we will have a shorter class this week due to ISA.

1. Externalities
	* + Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International
		Migration,” APSR 97:4 (November 2003) pp. 603-620.
		+ “Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International
		Disputes” (with Kristian Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan), Journal of Conflict
		Resolution 52 (August 2008), pp. 479-506.
		+ Idean Salehyan, “The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of
		International Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2008): 787-801.
		+ Kenneth Schultz, “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining:
		Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars,” International
		Organization, forthcoming.
2. War Termination
* Kristopher Ramsay, “Settling it on the Field,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52:6 (2008): 850-879.
* James Fearon, “Fighting Rather Than Bargaining” (2007)
* C.R. Mitchell and Michael Nicholson, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (September 1983): 495-520.
* [OPTIONAL] Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983

Week 6 (February 25, 2015): ***Security Institutions***

*Issue Paper: Isabella*

* + Paul Schroeder (1976)
	+ Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane (1999)
	+ David. H. Bearce, Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros. “Internal Information, Alliances, and Military Conflict among Member-States,” [*International Organization*](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=INO) 60, 3 (2006): 595-625
	+ Virginia Fortna, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” *International Organization* 57:2 (2003): 337-372.
* Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,” *International Organization* 57(2003): 801-827.
* John Ikenberry. *After Victory*. Chpts. 1-2 and a case study chapter.

Week 7 (March 4, 2015): ***Democratic Peace Theory***

*Issue Paper: Yihao*

A. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51:4 (1997), pp. 513-554.

1. For
* Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
* Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” American Political Science Review, 87, 3, (1993):624-638.
* [OPTIONAL] John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86.
1. Against
* Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 585-602.
* David Kinsella, “No Rest for the Democratic Peace,” American Political
Science Review 99 (2005): 453-457.
* [OPTIONAL] Branislav L. Slantichev, Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke, “Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 99 (2005): 459-462.
1. Democracies and Military Power
* Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security Vol. 20, No. 1, (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.
* Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition," International Organization 57 (Winter 2003): 3-42.
* James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, 88, 3 (1994):577-592.
* [OPTIONAL] Stephen Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security 19 (Spring 1995): 5-31.

Week 8: March 11, 2015: ***China***

*Issue Paper: Luuk*

* A. Johnston, *“Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 32-65.*
* M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3 (December 2011), pp. 292-319
* Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster: China’s Rise and U.S. Strategy Toward East Asia,” *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006)
* David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 78-85.
* Zheng Bijian, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2005)
* Daniel Blumenthal, “What Happened to China’s Peaceful Rise?,” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2010
* Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March-April 2011), pp. 54-67
* Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power finds its Way,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011)
* Raymond Kuo. “China’s Choice: Multilateral-Lite Partnerships and Asian Security.” *Draft* *article.*
* [OPTIONAL] David Shambaugh, “The Illusion of Chinese Power”, The National Interest, June 25, 2014. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-illusion-chinese-power-10739>
* [OPTIONAL] Avery Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?” in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 57-106.

March 18, 2015: ***No Class***

Week 9 (March 25, 2015): **Psychological Accounts for Conflict and Leadership**

*Issue Paper: Yihao*

1. Psychological
* Barbara Farnham (ed.) *Avoiding Losses, Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). First Levy chapter on Prospect Theory, Jervis chapter. OPTIONAL: One empirical chapter.
* Richard Ned Lebow. *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 101-147.
* Robert Jervis. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapters 3, 8-9; p.58-113; 319-355.
* Stein, Janice Gross. 2002, Chpt 15 “Psychological Explanations of International Conflict”, in *Handbook of International Relations*, Carlsnaes, Risse, Simmons, eds. Thousand Oaks; Sage Publications.
1. Leaders
* Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25 (March 2001): 107- 146.
* Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin Olken, "Hit or Miss?: The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War," NBER Working Paper No. W13102 (2008). <http://economics.mit.edu/files/3055>
* McDermott, Rose. 2008. Chpt 2, “Aging, Illness, and Addiction.”
* [OPTIONAL] William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force,” International Organization 59:1 (2005): 209-232
* [OPTIONAL] Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” [American Political Science Review](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR) 99:1 (February 2005): 107-123.

Week 10 (April 1, 2015): ***Economics and Power***

*Issue Paper: Luuk*

1. Classic Texts
	* Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, pp. 3-39.
	* David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, chs. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7.
	* [OPTIONAL] Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power, ch. 4.
2. Extensions
	* Dale Copeland. (1996). “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.” *International Security*. Vol. 20, No. 4.
	* Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest" International Security, (Fall 1993), pp. 125-153.
	* Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?: A Review Essay," in Lynn-Jones Reader, pp. 81-104.
	* Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51:1 (2007): 166-191.
	* Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu. (2012). “Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence.” *International Security*. Vol. 36, No. 4.
	* [OPTIONAL] Han Dorussen, “Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict: What You Trade Matters,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50: 1(February 2006): 87-107.
	* [OPTIONAL] Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Fall 1997).
	* [OPTIONAL] David A. Baldwin and Robert Pape, “Evaluating Economic Sanctions*,” International Security* Vol. 23, No. 2, (Fall 1998), pp. 189-198.

Week 11 (April 8, 2015): ***Religion and Conflict***

*Issue Paper: Joshua*

* David Clingingsmith, Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Michael Kramer. 2009 “Estimating The Impact of the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam’s Global Gathering.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 124: 1133-1170.
* Christine C. Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2013. “Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution.
* Michael C. Horowitz. 2009. “Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading.” International Security 34:162-193.
* Ron E. Hassner and Michael C. Horowitz. 2010. “Debating the Role of Religion in War.” International Security 35:201-208.
* Ron E. Hassner. 2011. “Sacred Time and Conflict Initiation.” Security Studies 20:491- 520.
* Ron Hassner. 2003. “The Trial and Crucifixion of Jesus: A Modest Proposal.” Theory
and Decision 54:1-32.
* Eric Chaney. Forthcoming. “Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power. Econometrica. <http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/chaney/files/paper_0_0.pdf>

Week 12 (April 15, 2015): ***Nuclear Proliferation***

*Issue Paper: Isabella*

If you’ve never read it before: Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Especially Chpts. 1-3 and 5.

1. Demand side
	* Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization 67 (2013): 173-195. (Compellence)
	* Vipin Narang, “What Does it Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution. (Deterrence)
2. Supply side
	* Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” American Political Science Review 103 (2009): 113-132.
	* Matthew Fuhrmann, “Talk a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
3. Regulation
	* Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010): 831-858.
	* Sarah E. Kreps and Matther Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?” Journal of Strategic Studies 34 (2011): 161-187.
4. New Directions
	* Christopher Way and Jessica Weeks, “Making it Personal: Regime Type and
	Nuclear Proliferation,” Working Paper, July 2012. <http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/jlw338/WayWeeksNukes.pdf>
	* Alexander Debs and Nuno Monteiro, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear
	Proliferation,” Working Paper, 2013. <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00177>

Week 13 (April 22, 2015): ***Insurgency and Terrorism***

*Issue Paper: Joshua*

* Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare. Chs. 2 and 6.
* Michael C. Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism." *International Organization* 64 (2010):33-64.
* Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.” *International Security*, 31,1 (summer 2006), 49-80.
* Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.” *International Security*, 31,2 (fall 2006), 42- 78.
* Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy." *International Security*, 32, 4 (Spring 2008):78-105.
* Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science (April 2008).
* Eli Berman and David Laitin. “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model.” (2006). <http://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports/168>
* David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Chpts. 2, 3 (first section only), 7. <http://louisville.edu/armyrotc/files/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf>
* [OPTIONAL] Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Do Working Men Rebel: Unemployment and Violence in Iraq and the Philippines,” Working Paper (2009)

Week 14 (April 29, 2015): ***Environmental Security and Migration***

*Issue Paper: Cecilia*

* Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” in Art and Jervis, pp. 347-353. (6 pp.)
* Elinor Ostrom, “Reflections on the Commons,” in Ostrim, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990), pp. 2-21. (20 pp.)
* Kenneth Oye and James H. Maxwell, “Self-Interest and Environmental Management,” in Robert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom, eds. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains (1995), pp. 191-221. (31 pp.)
* Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security. 20/2 (Fall 1995): 35-62.
* Nina Graeger. "Environmental Security?" Journal of Peace Research, 33/1 (February 1996): 109-116.
* Salehyan, I. (2008). From climate change to conflict? No consensus yet. *Journal of Peace*
*Research, 45* (3), 315-326.
* Joanna I. Lewis, "China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2007), pp. 155-174
* Joanna I. Lewis, “Climate Change and Security: Examining China’s Challenges in a Warming World,” International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 6 (2009), pp. 1195–1213
* [OPTIONAL] Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy." *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 44-76. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/>
* [IGNORE] Sam Sarkesian, "The Demographic Component of Strategy." Survival 31/6 (1989): 549-64.
* [IGNORE] Nicholas Eberstadt, "Population Change and National Security." Foreign Affairs, 70/3 (Summer 1991): 115-21.
* [IGNORE] “The Geriatric Peace.”

Week 15 (May 6, 2015): ***Technology and Security***

*Issue Paper: Joshua*

* Stephen Biddle. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
* Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March/April 1996): 37-54.
* Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." *The National Interest* (Fall 1994): 30-42.
* Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Future Warfare." *Security Studies*, 8, 1 (Autumn 1998), 1-74.